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Abstract
Academic inbreeding is a deeply ingrained practice which 
needs to be understood by reference to the medieval guilds. 
Drawing on the guild concept and associated benefits of 
forms of capital, a distinction is drawn between ‘guild-route’ 
academics who have followed a privileged, linear path into 
academe and their ‘non-guild’ counterparts who tend to enter 
later in their career from the professions or industry, often 
without a PhD. The tendency to represent early career re-
searchers from a guild background as members of an academic 
proletariat is largely misleading and fails to take account of 
their privileged entrée into academe. Their experience is con-
trasted with those recruited via the non-guild route who do 
not have the benefits of the valued social, cultural or symbolic 
capital needed to advance their careers. Policy implications 
are discussed to better understand the effects of academic 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Academic inbreeding is normally defined as ‘a recruitment practice in which universities hire their own graduates 
as faculty directly after doctoral graduation’ (Horta et al., 2011, p. 36). Yet, academic inbreeding needs to be un-
derstood on the network as well as institutional level. The research students of senior professors at research-in-
tensive universities are part of these wider networks of relevantly similar institutions. This directly influences the 
hiring of academic staff at a cluster of other, elite universities (Shin et al., 2016).
Academic inbreeding has always been the basis for the reproduction of the academic profession, but it needs 
to be understood as a continuing historical reflection of the university's medieval roots. In contemporary times, 
however, there has been a tendency to characterise inbreeding as a corrupt departure from egalitarian and meri-
tocratic norms via the nepotistic employment of doctoral students as junior academics in research-intensive uni-
versities. This is how inbreeding now appears seriously out of step, particularly in Western society, where privilege 
based on social connections is considered as outdated as a hereditary system of absolute rule. Yet meritocratic and 
egalitarian principles are themselves the invention of a liberal conception of higher education for both students 
(formerly ‘pupils’) and academics (formerly ‘masters’) who work within universities. These liberal principles have 
gained traction since the mid 19th century when universities first started to admit religious minorities and others 
formerly labelled as ‘heretics’, as well as becoming more open to women and working-class students. Liberal prin-
ciples are now perceived to be in conflict with the roots of academic nepotism, but the continuing power of a guild 
system of academic recruitment means that while such principles are virtue signalled by the modern university, 
they are still widely overridden in practice.
This paper will explore the medieval origins of academic inbreeding and explain how this underpins sustained 
inequalities between guild-route and non-guild-route academics. It will be argued that guild-route academics 
are best able to gain full access to valued social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986) to secure a higher status 
(increased position and thus power) within the academic hierarchy, maximising the personal benefits that derive 
from academic capitalism, prestige and cronyism. Non-guild-route academics, by contrast, are less able to lever-
age these advantages.
2  | THE MEDIE VAL GUILD AND THE PhD
The origins of the university were as a corporate body of equals making decisions on a collective basis. It oper-
ated in parallel with the medieval guild but with a strong hierarchical structure (Wilson, 1942). The Latin word 
universitas implied a guild, of which there were various types for occupationally related merchants and artisans 
(Epstein, 1998; Ogilvie, 2011; Renard, 1918), and scholastic guilds consisting of pupils and masters (Rashdall, 1895). 
These were the original universities in medieval times associated with teaching using the critical method of philo-
sophical analysis. They were established without the formal authorisation of the monarchy or the church but were 
later recognised by them, such as the University of Paris, originally named Universitas magistrorum et scholarium (a 
guild of masters and scholars) (Classen, 1981). Guilds enjoyed the right to self-determination, what today we would 
call institutional autonomy, granted to the medieval academic guilds of masters by church and state because of the 
benefits their activities were perceived to offer to society. They were permitted to develop their own rules and 
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of academic tenure is rooted in the privileges of scholastic guilds. Hence, guilds sought to develop exclusive ben-
efits for members and were, in today's terms, elitist organisations that promoted credentialism, cronyism and the 
privileges of the old boy network (Miller & Fox, 1998).
It is no accident that the Guild of European Research-Intensive Universities founded in 2016 is the name 
chosen to represent a contemporary grouping of 15 elite institutions with ancient origins; members such as the 
University of Paris and the Jagiellonian University originated as medieval guilds in the 12th and 14th century, 
respectively. The guild concept may be perceived as an irrelevance in a contemporary environment where uni-
versities are increasingly seen as subject to managerial processes and assumptions based on the metaphor of the 
free market. The power of the professoriate and, with it, traditional guild power, is thought to be on the wane due 
to the emphasis since the 1980s on new public management (e.g., Enders, 2000). This means that the notion of 
academic self-governance has withered (Shattock, 2014). Yet, this is not the only element of the guild tradition 
and ironically, at an individual level, those academics who are inbred in the traditions of research scholarship are 
much better equipped to manage the neoliberal pressures for the university to become more performance-driven 
since they know how to publish and obtain funding through leveraging their social networks. In many respects, the 
guild concept persists in modern higher education despite the trappings of modernity associated with the public 
adoption of more open recruitment processes and a widening participation agenda for students.
By the 19th century, the scholastic guild concept had evolved into a system of advancement in the eight 
Prussian universities which subsequently became the model for the rest of the world, with the doctorate in phi-
losophy as the entry qualification for the academic profession. Outstanding students who had obtained their 
doctorate would seek to become a Privatdocent once they had passed their Habilitation, through further scholarly 
work (Arnold, 1882). The Privatdocent was, in effect, an apprentice and was not in receipt of a salary. They were 
reliant on charging fees for lectures in competition with full professors but were not allowed to charge less than 
their masters, a rule that kept full professors up to the mark and ensured that the Privatdocent was kept hungry 
and had ‘every motive to exert himself’ (Arnold, 1882, p. 143). If they did not perform well, they did not make a 
living or progress any further in their academic career. The next step was for a Privatdocent to seek to become a 
professor extraordinary, only some of whom received a salary. This again made perceptions of their performance 
in providing lectures critical to the prospect of any further advancement to full professor. It is only then that a 
fixed salary was assured on condition of giving at least two free public lectures per week each semester but with 
the opportunity to top up their income via examination fees and further fee-charging lectures. The Prussian 
universities also had much in common with the guilds in terms of self-governance. The senate consisted of the 
incoming and outgoing rector (or president/vice chancellor) responsible for internal affairs, and each elected for 
just 1 year, together with a full professor selected from the four faculties (theology, law, medicine and philosophy). 
The faculty would consist of a dean, again elected for a single year only, together with the full professors.
The Prussian system has subsequently formed the basis for the academic profession across the world mainly 
through the export of the PhD to the United States (US) and, later, to the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1920s, with 
tenure systems that place heavy demands on academic apprentices with the ultimate prize of job security and 
a steady income once this hurdle has been surmounted. What is notable is that the Prussian system was highly 
competitive. While it was formed around teaching rather than research, through the giving of lectures, the model 
parallels modern academic tenure in the sense that junior academics, the Privatdocents or assistant professors 
of today, were made to compete hard to gain membership through advancement. This system perhaps helps to 
explain why the jobs market for academics remained largely closed to open recruitment processes until the 1960s 
with masters taking care of their apprentices in the way of the medieval guild (Wilson, 1942). Academic positions 
were often not formally advertised and senior academics would act as brokers in helping to fill any vacancies. This 
old boy network meant that senior academics held key information about where job opportunities existed and, in 
effect, helped to control the marketplace. The power of elite social networks in both developed and developing 
contexts means that the recruitment process is still at least partially closed. Even in the early 2000s, it was esti-
mated that between 90 and 100 per cent of academic hires in Spain and Italy were confined to internal or local 
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candidates (Gui et al., 2002). Closed hiring practices and cronyism also continue to prevail in Asian cultures such 
as Vietnam (Pham & Nguyen, 2020) and Japan (Horta et al., 2011).
3  | GUILD -ROUTE AND NON- GUILD -ROUTE AC ADEMIC S
The concept of social groups is nothing new; it can be traced back to the early social phulon (Donlan, 1985) among 
Dark Age Greeks, or the male drinking clubs and social banquets of classical Greece and Rome (Black, 2017; 
Hänninen, 2015). These social events were an important, ceremonial component of medieval guilds (Black, 2017), 
the long-distance trading associations referred to as ‘Universitas’ or ‘Hansa’ (Ogilvie, 2014; Põder, 2010). The 
origins of the term ‘guild’ in the 1st century AD—Gilda—signified the reinforcement of ‘social solidarity’ through 
the ceremonial act of the banquet (Black, 2017; Hänninen, 2015). Ogilvie (2011, p. 1), suggesting that the social 
gatherings of these ‘privileged associations’, solely focused on attaining social capital for the economic growth of 
the guild, were used to pressure group members to conform, to reinforce cultural identity. The original guilds pro-
vided privileges for members such as exemption from taxes, better working hours and a badge of quality. Though 
we have now come to associate the idea of the guild as being a professional organisation, the original Germanic 
gilt meant ‘fraternities of young warriors practising the cult of heroes’ (Le Bras, 1940–1941, p. 316 note, cited in 
Black, 2017), which one could argue is analogous with the idea of the university.
The medieval trade and craft guilds had steep entry fees and continuing dues to keep entry selective and, with 
increasing political motives, they became more exclusionary over time (Renard, 1918). They worked by a system 
of apprentices and masters (Epstein, 1998), and enforced quality standards through completion of training and the 
protection of membership. Similarly, the modern university has yearly tuition fees for entry and the concept of 
the exit qualification, the qualification of the degree, as its measure of standardisation and quality. In some of the 
oldest institutions such as Oxford and Cambridge which retain their original form of segregation, being ‘endowed 
houses under the supervision of a master’ (University of Oxford, 2020), the modern colleges continue to under-
take ritual social practices such as the medieval custom of ceremonial dining for institutional maintenance (Dacin 
et al., 2010), in supporting and strengthening their identity and beliefs.
Guilds provided transferable skills; students would be apprenticed (the modern equivalent of the bachelor) 
to become a craftsman (graduate/master's student) before spending several years as a journeyman (doctoral stu-
dent) before getting the chance to be elected as a master (doctoral graduate) (Huisman, 2012) on payment of a 
fee and the production of a masterpiece (the doctoral thesis). The masters of the medieval guild could recover 
costs associated with training their ‘students’ by making them work for wages below the market rate once they 
had reached a certain skill level (Epstein, 1998). This practice is akin to the use of doctoral students to teach 
undergraduate seminars in the modern university setting. Even in the contemporary university business school, 
PhD students are seen as the modern equivalent to the apprentices found in the medieval craft guilds, while the 
tenured faculty parallel the guild masters (Miles, 2016).
Just as the university is the space in which scholars carry out their academic roles, the guildhall was the equiv-
alent for these medieval training associations called guilds. A symbolic value was conferred on the guildhalls, as 
the ‘ceremonial stage’ upon which the guild carried out its acts of social relations to solidify its identity; it was a 
symbol of power and authority (Giles, 1999). The same could be argued for the modern university, imbued with 
the prestige of not only the institution but the centre of what is still seen as an ‘elite’, scholarly career in academe. 
The functionalist, structural interpretation of buildings would argue that the space itself is not merely a ‘container 
for human action, but is active in the construction and maintenance of social relations and power structures' 
(Giles, 1999, p. 14). The concept of ‘space syntax’, coupled with Durkheim's theories on society as used by Hillier 
and Hanson (1989), tells us that spaces reflect the society which used them. The group structures and shared 
values and beliefs of the medieval guild members, who Durkheim (1982) referred to as “technical” societies, is 
reflected in the segregated and dispersed spaces of the medieval guildhall itself. The university as a physical space 
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mirrors the medieval guildhall with its segregated spaces yet communal, ‘public’ areas for rituals (Giles, 1999). 
Within the university, scholars are separated by physical divisions such as different buildings and office spaces for 
the faculty or field of study. Within the discipline itself, scholars are divided by department, level and type of work 
they carry out. The physical division within the university reflects the social structure, practices and sociopolitical 
complexity of modern academia, where smaller, closed groups form within the larger ‘guild’ of academia itself.
In a similar way to which symbolic value was transferred to the guildhalls by the guild members, symbolic 
prestige is endowed upon the university today. The university's ‘members’, both students and academic staff, are 
imbued with prestige by association which can influence hiring decisions leading to cumulative advantage of those 
already in positions of privilege. As ‘networks of knowledge and learning’ (Huisman, 2012, p. 4), modern universi-
ties retain this function first seen in the guilds of old, providing a means for guild ‘members’ such as PhD students 
to travel to study under professors—the masters of their field—to become professors themselves.
Papers exploring inbreeding in university life understandably focus on the advantages enjoyed by those we 
could refer to as ‘elite’ academics, entering higher education via what we have labelled the ‘guild route’. Akin to 
the journeymen of the medieval guilds, their modern counterpart is the PhD student who has studied for and 
completed a PhD on a full-time basis at an elite, research-intensive university to become a ‘master’ themselves. 
This usually follows acquisition of prior qualifications—normally bachelor and master's degrees—also undertaken 
at research-intensive institutions (if not the same one) without ever leaving academe. They are imbued with the 
prestige, and the symbolic, cultural and social capital, of the institution which they attended and of the professors 
under whom they studied.
Bourdieu (1987, p. 3) argued that social class is not merely ‘homogeneous sets of economically and socially 
differentiated individuals’, but rather a social space of relational positions, within which individuals struggle for 
power (through the acquisition of capital). Groups which arise within a social space exist solely through their 
relationship to one another, their positionality, and are defined by their ‘distance’. Distinct from the general no-
tion of social class, academic social class is a result of the relationship, and subsequent ‘distance’ in terms of 
knowledge, values and benefits, between those who are associated with the ‘elite’ research-intensive institutions 
and those who are associated with the lower-status, teaching-focused, more vocationally oriented institutions. 
In other words, academic social class is derived from leveraging the benefits of reputational prestige, capital and 
networks associated with a person's alma mater. Research-intensive universities, drawn from the Russell Group in 
the UK, the Group of 8 in Australia, and the Ivy League in the US, for example, are the most prestigious institutions 
where ‘top-class’ guild-route academics are trained, retained and prosper. In the UK there is a divide between the 
research-intensive Russell Group and the teaching-intensive universities which have a larger focus on vocational 
qualifications, where significantly fewer staff hold PhDs, and fewer, full professorial positions are available (Higher 
Education Statistics Agency, 2020a, 2020b). Opportunities for full-time research training in teaching-intensive 
universities with smaller and fewer academic departments are scarce; where they do exist, academic supervisors 
will not necessarily possess the same elite networks or relevant social and cultural capital of the guild-route 
scholar to pass onto their students nor increase their own position in the academic hierarchy. The lower-status, 
teaching-intensive institutions do not imbue the same privilege and prestige through association, neither exter-
nally nor within their own ranks. This means that, while there are some inbred academics in teaching-intensive 
universities, they are relatively fewer in number and are at a disadvantage compared with their more privileged, 
guild-route cousins in research-intensive institutions.
4  | INHABITING THE ‘RIGHT’ HABITUS
If we therefore accept the existence of an elite ‘guild route’, one would automatically assume there must be an 
opposite, a ‘non-guild route’. As previously established, the idea of the guild is exclusionary; non-guild does not 
necessarily mean you are part of an ‘opposing’ group, but rather are excluded for the privileged group. Drawn 
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from the ‘world of work’ rather than the traditional academic who has never left academe, non-guild academics 
are more likely to join a more teaching-intensive, vocationally oriented higher education institution, rather than 
an elite, research-intensive one—the original home of the guild-route academic. Where non-guild academics join 
a research-intensive university, they may be more likely to be offered a contract on ‘teaching-only’ terms as op-
posed to a more prestigious contract to both teach and undertake research (an ‘all-round’ contract). On entry into 
the higher education profession, many non-guild academics do not possess a PhD and may be required to com-
plete this on a part-time basis as a mature student while working in the university as an academic member of staff.
In contrast to the traditional guild route, the non-traditional academic career route of the non-guild scholar 
often begins later in life, having spent a time working in the professions, the performing arts, business or industry. 
Each of the prior roles these non-guild scholars held could arguably be thought of as a smaller guild in itself; pro-
fessions such as nursing, law and certain business occupations, including banking and marketing, have their own 
standards for entry and protections afforded through membership. In addition to their mismatch in valued capital 
between their non-academic, professional ‘guild’ and their new ‘academic’ guild, the collective habitus derived 
from these smaller, non-academic guilds is unlikely to help them understand the ‘rules of the game’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992) in the field of higher education and research, affecting their perceptions of, and journey within, 
academia.
Often called ‘late bloomers’, these non-guild-route academics may be tied to specific geographic regions due 
to family obligations or a partner's job; prohibited from national job searches, they are restricted in the type of 
institution in which they can work (Karlgaard, 2019; Kim, 2019). Consequently, they may find themselves having 
to move around different institutions to ‘get ahead’. Inherently mobile, they are unlikely to amass the prestige and 
valued capital required when compared to their relatively immobile guild-route counterparts, which may play a not 
insignificant part in the prevalence of academic inbreeding among the ‘top’, elite institutions (Altbach et al., 2015; 
Horta et al., 2010) in many nations, including Argentina (Rabossi, 2015), Poland (Kosmulski, 2015) and Spain (Cruz-
Castro & Sanz-Menéndez, 2010; Rocca, 2007).
Bourdieu's (1977) concept of the habitus provides a way to analyse the social world and social practices, to 
explore the effect of this ‘guild’ membership in academe. A ‘collective’ habitus gained through group membership 
‘can directly shape the habitus and practices of individuals' (Burke et al., 2013, p. 167); although the habitus of 
individuals will vary, there is a co-operation between members of a group; it is a conformity of sorts, through af-
finity both within, and between, groups and the wider social field (Balmer et al., 2017; Burke et al., 2013). In other 
words, despite individual agency, guild membership will influence how the scholar perceives and experiences 
academe, with membership inherently providing distinct advantages over those who are not privy to the group's 
values and behaviours.
It is important to understand, and contrast, the effects of academic inbreeding on the divided fortunes of 
guild and non-guild academics. Early-career guild academics are often seen as victims of unfairness and inequality, 
based on conventional measures such as gender, family and caring responsibilities, and the prevalence of insecure, 
fixed-term contracts. Yet this group enjoys many inbuilt advantages in terms of capital which make claims to a 
proletarian identity suspect at best. Non-guild academics with their mismatch in social and cultural capital are the 
real proletarians, as opposed to those who have had a linear, guild route from PhD through to an early-career po-
sition such as a postdoctoral fellow. These non-guild academics are not only late starters but largely do not work 
in institutions where they can acquire sufficient social and cultural capital to enable them to move into the re-
search-focused world of the guild academic. If they do work in elite, research-intensive universities they are likely 
to be even more disadvantaged as they are entering an environment where the guild tradition is most strongly 
established. Guilds are about exclusion rather than the modern liberal notion of inclusion, and about needing to be 
able to determine who is an insider and who is an outsider. New entrants need to perform behaviours and model 
themselves in the image of other insiders. Guild members already hold valued cultural, social and economic cap-
ital (Bourdieu, 1986) as ‘traditional’ academics. Unless non-guild members obtain a doctoral degree, understand 
how to conduct research, obtain prestigious funding and publish results in esteemed academic journals they will 
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remain outsiders. Even if they succeed in gaining entry in the university guild, they will not be able to enjoy the full 
benefits of guild membership as they do not have sufficient social capital (social connections) nor cultural capital 
(institutional qualification, embodied behaviours and symbolic prestige) which lifelong guild members possess.
Social and cultural capital appears to be strongly related to the advantages of academic inbreeding and guild 
membership. Bourdieu (1986) argued that education reproduces social inequality through ‘hereditary transmis-
sion’ (p. 244) of cultural capital; graduates of a university will, often unconsciously, acquire capital—in its various 
forms—through simply attendance and association. Guild academics not only acquire cultural capital in its institu-
tionalised form by securing a doctoral qualification but also symbolic capital as institutional or departmental pres-
tige (Bourdieu, 1986). Through attendance of this elite institution, they will embody the attitude and behaviours 
of the institution or department, and conform to its norms, values and beliefs.
Bourdieu (1986) referred to social capital as the acquisition of resources in the form of ‘a durable network of 
more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (p. 248); in other words, mem-
bership of an exclusive group which provides not only social capital but also a collective, cultural capital through 
symbolic exchange and mutual obligation. Acquiring social capital to enhance one's position involves building 
relationships; in relation to academic inbreeding, doctoral graduates of an institution will hold greater social cap-
ital through association with academic staff compared with external candidates for hire, as they have had the 
opportunity to build those vital, internal networks. Social capital is about knowing the ‘right people’ and having 
networks of well-connected colleagues for personal advancement from which collaborations and opportunities of 
various kinds flow. The term used to capture the essence of social capital in a British context is the ‘old boy net-
work’ while equivalents exist elsewhere internationally such as ‘guanxi’ (China) and ‘kancei’ (Japan). On a practical 
level, social capital operates in academic life in the form of references and recommendations for studentships and 
professorial positions, and more subtly through the world of introductions at conferences, invitations to contrib-
ute to edited books and special issues of academic journals, co-authorship and citation rings. Co-authorship is 
indicative of symbolic and social capital inasmuch as prestige by association can flow from who someone publishes 
with, such as a senior intellectual figure in the field, as opposed to simply what is published. In this way intellectual, 
peer-to-peer capital is generated which can be valuable in network and career building. The social capital acquired 
from a relationship is greater than any one individual will hold; the individual is ‘known to more people than they 
know’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 251), a kind of ‘reputational’ capital if you will. By keeping access to group membership 
limited (such as with academic inbreeding—hiring one's own graduates) the group can reinforce its values and 
beliefs, maintaining its social and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1986).
One of the most significant elements of social network activities is the hiring exchange of PhDs between 
departments and universities explaining more than 80 per cent of the variance in sociology departmental pres-
tige (Burris, 2004). Here, there is a parallel with the exchange of marriage partners as in the Indian caste system. 
Whereas ‘most prestigious academic departments rarely hire PhDs from lesser ranked departments, the converse 
is not true’ (Burris, 2004, p. 244). This demonstrates the centrality of institutional status to academic prestige and 
the role of PhD exchange in reinforcing such divisions. Social capital will tend to work most to the advantage of 
academics at ancient, elite or research-intensive universities where the old boy network is most strongly estab-
lished, as opposed to lower status, teaching-focused institutions. Bruce Truscot, writing in the 1940s, contrasted 
the advantages of working at Oxbridge rather than one of the (then, so-called) ‘redbrick’ universities, providing 
the following illustration:
The modern equivalent to the less highly esteemed ‘Redbrick’ to which Truscot refers is now represented by 
the ‘new’ universities consisting of the polytechnics and other institutions who mainly cater for students enter-
ing to study subjects leading to vocational, technical and semi-professional occupations. Hence, cultural capital 
relates to forms of knowledge, skills, education and advantages that give a person a higher status in society. This 
is acquired through the privileges associated with elite educational backgrounds and, with respect to academic 
life, this relates to tacit knowledge in connection with teaching and research. Academic inbreeding produces 
an understanding of the rules needed to succeed in the ‘research game’ (Lucas, 2006), central to which is now 
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grant getting in addition to writing for publication, as well as the unconscious doxa (Bourdieu, 1977; Deer, 2012) 
inherent in guild membership. Knowing how to ‘do’ research is developed as a doctoral student and as a junior 
academic working in a series of postdoctoral appointments. These not only help to build the social capital through 
connections needed to succeed but, critically, knowledge of how to write for publication and gain research-grant 
funding, the latter of which has become increasingly important as academic capitalism has taken hold. Guild-route 
academics have invariably benefited from mentoring and inclusion through participating in a mentor's research 
project. This experience will mean that they ‘may be better able to cope with the challenges of their own research 
later’ (Sassi & Thomas, 2012, p. 840).
In addition to the conscious awareness of the steps required to gain capital, to increase one’s power and 
position in the field of higher education, this unconscious, taken-for-grantedness (doxa) (Deer, 2012) is exhibited 
by those of guild membership, in which ‘each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact of acting in accordance with 
social convention’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 169). They implicitly know the ‘rules of the game’; expected behaviours and 
predispositions are inherited through membership. This doxa can be thought of as a form of symbolic power me-
diated by the accumulation of capital which ‘relates to the habitus and power structure of relatively autonomous 
social fields which have their own specific logic and necessity’ (Deer, 2012, p. 117). The field of higher education 
could be considered to be one of those autonomous social fields; guild-route academics inherently understand 
the requirements for succeeding in ‘elite’ research circles which have their own rules and logic, which will contrast 
with those of the various fields of work with which non-guild-route academics are familiar.
Many junior guild academics have been in full-time education all their adult lives and have enjoyed the spon-
sorship of parents and influential senior supervisors. These ‘traditional’ academics are often from privileged, 
wealthy backgrounds—the middle classes (Manstead, 2018), particularly in a UK context. They have pre-existing 
knowledge of the higher education system and the role of the academic, prior to entering it. Their familial capital, 
coupled with their familial habitus with its ‘deeply ingrained system of perspectives, experiences and predispo-
sitions family members share’ (Reay, 1998, p. 527) provides an advantage in the elite, research-focused, higher 
education ‘game’. They are better equipped to understand the ‘rules of the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Lareau et al., 2016) and more readily acquire the valued capital to enhance their power, and thus position, in the 
academic hierarchy—a tenured position at a research-intensive, ‘elite’ institution.
This prior parental sponsorship has enabled these guild-route academics to weather a period in their lives, 
possibly in their twenties and thirties, when others without the benefit of family-based social and financial sup-
port would not have been able to do so. This does not mean that they do not experience hardship and precarious 
employment, but if they leverage their capital successfully, they have far more opportunity to eventually gain a 
secure academic position. But this is as part of the conventional guild ritual whereby junior scholars are sifted. 
Otherwise joining the academic guild would not be considered a prestigious achievement. Taken together, their 
habitus combined with their social and cultural capital forms the basis for academic cronyism since they combine 
access to exclusive networks and the skills needed to exploit the opportunities to which these networks give rise.
In the literature, early career researchers (ECRs) from the guild route are often (mis)represented as members of 
the academic proletariat (Ylijoki & Henriksson, 2017). In reality, ECRs from a guild background are anything but a 
proletariat. In Ylijoki and Henriksson's (2017) study, all 12 of the participants were working full-time in research-in-
tensive universities, having achieved doctoral degrees in the social sciences within the previous 6 years. The vast 
majority of them were, in other words, guild academics. The term ‘ECR’ is in itself an indicator of guild bias in the 
sense that it fails to take account of the breadth of backgrounds which academics come from (Price et al., 2015). 
Price and her colleagues recognise the excluding nature of this term and associated norms such as ‘young’, but in 
defining an alternative—the early career academic (ECA)—demonstrate their own guild assumptions by labelling an 
ECA as someone within 5 years of having completed their doctorate. Such a definition would necessarily exclude 
large swathes of non-guild academics who may well be experienced professionals or practitioners in various fields 
but do not possess a PhD. Other papers concerning the experiences of those on ‘teaching-focused’ contracts tend 
to overrepresent guild-route ECRs. Hubbard et al. (2015, p. 4) promise case studies illustrating ‘a range of paths 
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into teaching positions’ only to subsequently present the profiles of four ‘guild-route’ academics, all of whom 
completed a PhD and moved on to a postdoctoral fellowship in elite universities. This is, in reality, a singular, linear 
guild path. In another study of ECAs at two research-intensive universities, the 52 participants recruited by insti-
tutional mailing lists included just three who were on teaching-only contracts (Hollywood et al., 2019). This is an 
indicator of how academics on teaching-only contracts are still simply not thought of as ECAs, often because they 
are not within 5 years of having obtained a PhD. They may have obtained a PhD and spent more than 5 years in 
professional practice or industry and are now re-entering the sector. Quite commonly, they do not have a PhD on 
entry as a mature professional. Either way, they will probably have limited research experience.
Only non-guild-route entrants to the academic profession can lay claim to a proletarian identity since they 
do not possess the built-in advantages of ‘insiderism’ enjoyed by guild-route ECRs. Many non-guild entrants into 
the academic profession are from other professional or practice backgrounds, such as dentistry, law, marketing 
and business management. They are recruited to ensure that students on professional degree programmes are 
taught by university teachers with recent and relevant professional experience. While some may be members of 
other guild-like bodies (such as lawyers) it needs to be understood that by becoming an academic working in a 
university they are, in effect, entering a different guild and are therefore subject to a different set of rules, rituals 
and conventions, both social and linguistic. Their professional guild membership outside of academe provides no 
privileged access to the university guild. Further, individuals and groups can occupy different fields simultaneously 
(Thomson, 2012, p. 68); each field bestows effects upon position in the overarching social field and the potential 
to accumulate capital and dispositions of the habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), which affect one's chance of 
social mobility and perpetuates cumulative advantage. The non-guild scholar with intimate knowledge and expe-
rience in a previous occupation may find that, upon entering the field of higher education, they are lower in the 
hierarchy; their existing capital holds little value in their new, academic field.
5  | POLICY IMPLIC ATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There are a number of policy implications arising from the analysis of academic social class offered in this paper, 
especially for research-intensive institutions where guild-route academics are most likely to be developed and 
recruited. While there is growing discussion about equality, diversity and inclusivity in universities, much of 
this debate centres on conventional and singular forms of disadvantage, such as race, gender and social class. 
Disadvantage needs to be understood more holistically in terms of the intersectionality of all forms of discrimina-
tion, rather than in terms of an over-reliance on ‘discrete categories and groups’ (Walby et al., 2012, p. 226) such 
as gender, race, sexuality and social class. Intersectionality is about the overlap of multiple dimensions. The effects 
of guild power overlap with race, gender and social class, and need to be understood as a key element of disadvan-
tage in academic life that has been largely overlooked.
Our analysis suggests that academic social class and how it relates to advantage and disadvantage needs to be 
more deeply understood by reference to the guild concept. There is a need flowing from this realisation to better 
appreciate the moral case against the effects of academic patronage resulting from the exploitation of the capital 
accumulated by guild-route academics. This relates, perhaps most significantly, to recruitment practices within 
universities. Significant adjustments are needed to make them fairer and counteract the tendency to appoint 
internal candidates or closely related guild-route candidates. Breaking, or at least disrupting, this cycle of privilege 
is essential in stemming academic inbreeding. Serious attention needs to be given to introducing measures that 
ameliorate the effects of patronage and discriminate against non-guild-route academics. Examples include discon-
tinuing the use of terms such as school or department ‘fit’, commonly used as a criterion used by interview panels. 
To ascertain the scale of the problem, a review of appointments to academic positions, both permanent and 
temporary, might be undertaken. This could establish the proportion of internal candidates, former PhD students 
and other guild-route academics appointed to the university, and the use of highly specific criteria such as special 
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experience in particular projects, designed to ensure that candidates within the social network are successful. 
However, possibly the biggest challenge is for institutions, and indeed many individual academics, to accept that 
guild-route privilege not only exists but represents a form of bias and discrimination at the heart of academic life 
which has deleterious consequences. Unless these effects of the academic class system are recognised, academic 
inbreeding will not be recognised as a cause of unfairness.
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